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Executive Summary
A vast number of people in sub-Saharan Africa live in 
energy poverty. Over two-thirds of the region’s population, 
620 million people, lack access to electricity – a number 
almost twice that of the population of the United States. 
Four-fifths, or 750 million people, lack access to clean 
and modern methods of cooking their food – a number 
equivalent to the entire population of Europe (IEA, 2014). 
Around 65 per cent of primary schools and over 30 per 
cent of health facilities in sub-Saharan Africa also lack 
electricity (Practical Action, 2014). 
Not surprisingly, energy poverty is a major theme on the 
international development agenda. Given the scale of the 
problem, many are calling for a dramatic scale-up of the 
region’s power generation capacity. World Bank president 
Jim Kim has gone so far as to call Africa’s energy gap 
‘energy apartheid’. 
It is true that Africa has far less energy supply, 
particularly of power generation, than any other continent. 
However, evidence indicates that even dramatically 
expanding such supply will leave many in energy poverty. 
Even the International Energy Agency’s (2014) ambitious 
scenario for expansions in Africa’s power supply leaves 530 
million individuals in the region without electricity in 2040 
and 653 million without modern cooking services.
The reason is that most investment in power generation 
in Africa is not geared towards serving the basic 
energy needs of the poor; it is rather geared towards 
industrialization and the rising demands of existing 
consumers. In fact, two-thirds of the energy investment 
in Africa is devoted to producing energy for export. 
Approximately half of current electricity consumption in 
Africa is used for industrial activities – mostly mining and 
refining (IEA, 2014). 
The ‘energy access gap’ – the number of people without 
access to modern energy services – is largely distinct from 
the ‘industrial energy gap’ – the massive gap between 
installed electricity generation capacity in the industrialised 
and unindustrialised world. Greater ambition to close 
the industrial energy gap will not necessarily resolve the 
broader energy access gap.  
This paper revisits the roles that energy plays in poverty 
reduction. First, while energy does not reduce poverty 
itself, it delivers energy services. These services can improve 
poor people’s welfare both directly by enhancing their 
own productivity, education and health, and indirectly 
by changing the economy around them. The paper 
provides a simplified framework for thinking about these 
energy services, and then reviews the literature on their 
importance to poverty reduction (see Figure 1).
From this framework, we draw a series of three 
important conclusions about energy priorities and their 
implications for poverty reduction and development.
1) Tackling energy poverty will have less to 
do with ambitious expansion of electricity 
capacity, and more to do with ambitious 
distribution of energy services to poor people
At its most technical level, energy access means delivering 
energy to households above a base threshold. The lack of 
modern cooking services accounts for the largest share 
of incidences of energy poverty (see Figure 11), and 
addressing that lack has the clearest and most immediate 
benefits for human welfare (Bailis, Ezzati, & Kammen, 
2005; WHO, 2014). Policies that promote and underwrite 
access to improved cookstoves and fuels, for example, 
will be the most important for delivering modern cooking 
services. For this aspect of energy access, electricity supply 
will play a minimal role in their delivery (World Bank, 
2008). Figure 11 also shows that cooking technologies, 
while not expensive, face a significant shortfall in 
the investment needed to achieve universal access to 
households.
Delivering electricity services to households also 
generates rapid and immediate poverty reduction, as does 
the delivery of such services to schools, primary health 
clinics, and micro- and small-scale business enterprises 
(Pueyo, Gonzalez, Dent, & DeMartino, 2013; World 
Bank, 2008). For each of these end-users, easily distributed 
energy technologies, even if they deliver relatively small 
amounts of electricity, are frequently the most cost-
effective options for securing access to those services most 
important to poor people (Practical Action, 2014; Szabó, 
et al., 2011; USAID, n.d.). Figure 11 shows that a smaller 
proportion of the total incidences of energy poverty would 
be most cost-effectively treated through grid connections. 
More than 2.5 times additional investment is required 
to secure energy access through distributed systems than 
energy access through grid connections (IEA, 2011).
Incremental increases in poor people’s access to 
energy services reduce poverty and improve lives.  If 
there is anywhere that ‘energy apartheid’ can be said to 
exist, it is the absence of basic energy services for very 
poor people. Closing this energy access gap will require 
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ambitious investment in distributing energy services to 
households and communities.
2) Expansion in centralized power generation 
serves industry, the services sector and 
already-connected households, before it 
serves the poor.
Greater centralised generation is necessary to enable energy 
services that are valuable for industrialization. Powering 
industrial growth has the potential to reduce poverty 
through employment, and through greater government 
revenue, but its track record in doing so in Africa is 
mixed. A long chain of transformations must take place 
to ensure that the benefits of industrial growth reach 
poor people effectively. The dominance of the extractive 
sectors in Africa’s industrial growth makes this all the 
more challenging (IEA, 2014). Extractive industries have a 
weaker track record than other forms of industrial growth, 
such as manufacturing, in catalyzing poverty reduction. 
In fact, Africa’s energy input into non-industrial sectors 
like services and agriculture has historically produced 
more jobs than when input into industry (Practical Action, 
2012). 
It also cannot be assumed that the energy services most 
important to poor people would be delivered as a by-
product of ambitious expansions in electricity generation 
capacity, or even the expansion of both generation capacity 
and electrification. Even in communities that gain access to 
the electricity grid, connection tends to occur regressively: 
poor households often remain without electricity for years, 
even decades, as they are unable to afford the connection 
charges (World Bank, 2008). Hence, the challenge is not 
predominantly the technical one of radically expanding 
generation capacity; it is orienting policy to deliver 
electricity to those who need it most.
High ‘ambition’ to close the industrial energy gap risks 
neglecting the formidable policy task of providing energy 
access to all. Ambition is not merely about the number of 
megawatts installed, but the number of people reached.
3) Distributed, clean energy interventions are 
best suited to tackling energy poverty – and 
poverty more generally.
Many of the services that are important for poverty 
reduction would be most cost-effectively fulfilled by lower 
carbon technologies. Wherever the harvesting of biomass 
is unsustainable, a shift to more efficient biomass stoves, 
kerosene or LPG will tend to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions (Bailis, et al., 2005). Moreover, most households, 
schools, clinics, and micro- and small-scale enterprises 
located away from the electricity grid will best gain access 
through distributed renewable energy technologies. Solar 
photovoltaic (PV), wind, biomass, and micro-hydro would 
be the most cost-effective option for between 67.1 and 75.4 
per cent of off-grid and mini-grid household connections 
(IEA, 2014; Scott, forthcoming; Szabó, et al., 2011). These 
technologies solve some of the core delivery problems of 
getting key services to poor people. 
For the electricity poor that will gain access through 
the grid, large-scale renewable technologies can easily 
meet this demand. Distribution will remain the challenge. 
Evidence suggests that large-scale renewable technologies 
can also help to close the industrial energy gap. While 
closing this gap will be less useful to delivering energy 
access and energy services to the poor, their contribution to 
increased centralized capacity is important.
Speaking truth to power 7 
1. Energy poverty, revisited
Energy poverty is a major theme on the international 
development agenda. The UN General Assembly has 
declared 2014 to 2024 as the international decade of 
‘Sustainable Energy for All’, and the UN Secretary General 
has a flagship programme bearing the same name. The 
number of people that live without access to energy – in 
energy poverty – is substantial: 1.3 billion people lack 
basic access to electricity and 2.6 billion lack access to 
clean and safe energy for household cooking. Energy 
poverty is most pronounced in sub-Saharan Africa, where 
around 620 million people – more than two-thirds of the 
population – lack access to electricity. About 730 million 
people in the region – or four-fifths of the population – 
lack access to modern cooking services (IEA, 2014). To 
put these figures into some context: the number of people 
living without electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is almost 
double that of the entire population of the US, and the 
number living without modern cooking services equals the 
entire population of Europe.  
These statistics highlight formidable challenges. The 
international agenda calls for high megawatt generation 
projects and transmission schemes to rapidly close the 
‘energy gap’ between sub-Saharan Africa’s per capita 
installed electricity capacity and the capacity in the 
industrialised world. At the 2014 Africa Leaders’ Summit, 
World Bank President Jim Kim referred to the region’s 
vast energy gap as ‘energy apartheid’, and, alongside 
leaders of several African nations, cited a moral mandate 
to invest in power. Furthermore, the United States Agency 
for International Development’s (USAID) Power Africa 
programme commits $7 billion to the region between 
2013 and 2018 to add 30,000 megawatts (MW) of 
additional electricity capacity in a bid to boost capacity by 
approximately one third. The stated aim of Power Africa 
is to double access to electricity. Some commentators 
have noted, however, that a massive expansion in power 
capacity to end energy poverty could conflict with efforts 
to address climate change (Bazilian and Pielke, Jr., 2013).  
But what if the thinking of the development community 
on energy poverty is wrong? What if, in our race to close 
the energy access gap quickly and at scale, we fail to solve 
it at all? Does framing the energy access problem as one 
of prioritising generation create a false paradox between 
access and sustainability? 
The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) New Policies 
Scenario (2014) forecasts energy supply based on planned 
policies and investments. It projects that on-grid generation 
in sub-Saharan Africa will increase 350 per cent by 2040, 
from 440 to 1,541 terawatt hours (TWh)1 (IEA, 2014). 
Despite this rapid growth in supply, the IEA also projects 
energy poverty in 2040, with 530 million people still 
without electricity and 653 million without modern means 
of cooking their food. In absolute terms, this represents 
only a small reduction in the current numbers of people 
living in energy poverty. Factoring in population growth, 
30 per cent and 37 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans will 
remain without electricity and modern cooking services, 
respectively.
Why is it that so many people will not benefit from the 
projected massive increase in on-grid generation?
In reality, the biggest barrier to universal energy 
access is not the capacity to generate electricity, but 
rather the ability to get energy to those who need it 
most. The concept of energy poverty and access tends 
to focus on very small, incremental shifts in the delivery 
of energy to poor people. The total energy demand of 
these shifts constitutes only a small fraction of the ‘gap’ 
between electricity supply in much of Africa versus more 
industrialised countries, or the gap between the region’s 
current and projected electricity supply.    
1 A terawatt hour is equal to the sustained power of approximately 114 megawatts for a period of one year.
There are distinct energy gaps that 
require different interventions if they 
are to be bridged. The ‘industrial energy 
gap’, representing the massive gap of 
installed energy capacity between the 
industrialised and unindustrialised world, 
is not the same as the energy access 
gap, i.e., the cumulative deficit of energy 
access faced by those who are living in 
energy poverty. 
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Indeed, a forthcoming ODI report calculates that it would 
require the generation of only an additional 35 TWh above 
the levels that are being projected to provide universal 
electricity access to the region’s population by 2030  – only 
6 per cent of current annual consumption and an even 
smaller fraction of the levels that are being projected (Scott, 
forthcoming).  
Most current and projected investment in power 
production in sub-Saharan Africa aims to close the 
industrial energy gap. In 2012, industry consumed almost 
70 per cent of all electricity used for productive purposes 
(industry, agriculture, and services) in the region, and about 
half of all electricity consumed in general (IEA, 2014).2 
Most of this consumption was dominated by extractive 
industries, particularly mining and refining. In the 
future, the majority of projected expansion in electricity 
generation is expected to supply industry and the service 
sector and to meet growing demand from households that 
already have access to electricity.3 
While the industrial energy gap is expected to narrow 
or close in sub-Saharan Africa, the energy access gap is 
projected to remain wide open. By most evidence, energy 
poverty is not likely to be resolved as a mere corollary of 
the expansion of energy capacity (or even grid extension) 
across the region. Building a power plant does not 
guarantee greater energy access unless transmission, 
electrification, and connection policies are all aligned to 
bring energy services to those that lack them, and at a price 
that they can afford. 
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2 The services sector – led by telecommunications – consumes 23% of energy and 28% of electricity for productive purposes, while the agricultural sector 
consumes only 6% and 3%, respectively (IEA, 2014). 
3 Industrial electricity demand will more than double from 220 TWh in 2012 to over 440 TWh in 2040. The service sector, primarily telecommunications 
and a variety of small enterprises, accounted for 20% of electricity demand in 2012, or 88 TWh. Projections for the service sector are not provided, 
but increases in consumption are likely to be substantial. Although only 20% of the projected increase in electricity demand will be the result of new 
households gaining access to the electricity grid, residential electricity demand, driven by growing demand by already connected households, will expand 
more than five-fold from 94.4 TWh in 2012 to 520 TWh in 2040 overtaking industry to become the largest end-consumer of electricity (IEA, 2014).
In 2012, industry consumed almost 70 per 
cent of all electricity used for productive 
purposes (industry, agriculture, and 
services) in the region, and about half 
of all electricity consumed in general 
(IEA, 2014).4 Most of this consumption 
was dominated by extractive industries, 
particularly mining and refining.
4 The services sector – led by telecommunications – consumes 23% of energy and 28% of electricity for productive purposes, while the agricultural sector 
consumes only 6% and 3%, respectively (IEA, 2014). 
Box 1. Glossary of terms relating to energy and poverty
Energy services. The tangible benefits obtained from energy consumption, such as lighting, heating, 
communications or cooking. 
Energy poverty. The inability to meet basic energy services with reliable, affordable, legal and safe energy technologies. 
Energy access. The inverse of energy poverty. Having sufficient energy to meet basic energy services. Often 
measured along a spectrum.
Electricity access. Having access to reliable, affordable, legal and safe electricity in sufficient quantity to meet basic 
electricity-related energy needs, such as lighting, a fan and communication technologies. 
Energy access gap. The cumulative deficit of energy access for those living in energy poverty.
Income poverty. The state of having a level of income that is insufficient to meet basic consumption needs. This is 
measured using a narrowly defined indicator of poverty that is focused on income and consumption.
Industrial energy gap. The gap between the generation capacity and consumption of industrialised and 
unindustrialised countries. Coined to distinguish between this (very large) energy deficit and the energy poverty gap.
Multi-dimensional poverty. Poverty as measured by multiple indicators of human deprivation (or its inverse, 
welfare), including the lack of basic material possessions (food, water, sanitation, shelter, clothing), combined with 
social and political exclusion and a lack of economic opportunity. Typically this is measured using indices with 
multiple indicators, such as the multi-dimensional poverty index, that take into account such factors as health, 
education and living standards. 
Addressing energy poverty primarily through the 
traditional model of grid expansion would require 
substantially more time (decades) and financial capital 
than one based primarily on decentralised technologies. 
Furthermore, the latter would be likely to create far more 
jobs. For example, Practical Action (2014) estimated 
that electricity generated through solar photovoltaics 
(PV) creates between 8 and 10 times more jobs for every 
gigawatt hour (GWh) it generates than electricity generated 
through coal or natural gas.
Bazilian and Pielke Jr. (2013) contend that efforts to 
promote incremental shifts in energy access, such as those 
delivered through distributed electricity generation or clean 
cookstoves, suffer from a failure of ambition. They are not 
alone in this view, and quote the most striking articulation 
of it – from Kandeh Yumkella, the United Nations’ head 
of the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) agenda: ‘The 
provision of one light to poor people does nothing more 
than shine a light on poverty…’ (Yumkella, 2009, quoted 
in Bazilian and Pielke, Jr., 2013). 
Yumkella, Bazilian, and Pielke make an important point: 
delivering energy services to reduce poverty means more 
than just delivering energy to households. Energy is an 
indispensable input for activities outside of the household 
– including business enterprises and community services 
– that can also result in poverty reductions. Closing the 
industrial energy gap may also reduce poverty by growing 
the economy. Nevertheless, incremental shifts of energy 
services to poor people who currently lack access are also 
critically important. Figure 1 untangles the distinct but 
interlinked ways in which improved energy provision may 
have an impact on poverty. 
This paper brings these linkages to the fore. Section 
2 includes a typology of energy services, i.e. the tangible 
benefits derived from energy consumption (Kowsari & 
Zerriffi, 2011, p. 7513). Energy services range from the 
most basic household needs, such as cooking, to large-scale 
industrial activities. In each case, services are evaluated to 
determine their impact on energy poverty in particular, and 
poverty in general. The paper then considers how those 
energy services can best be delivered to achieve the twin 
objectives of alleviating both energy poverty and wider 
poverty. A mix of secondary quantitative and qualitative 
sources from academic journals, multilateral and 
development organisations, and governments were used 
in this analysis. Section 3 concludes with a discussion of 
the implications of the analysis for the larger debate about 
delivering sustainable energy access for all. 
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Figure 1. Energy’s pathways to poverty reduction
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2. Energy services for 
poverty reduction
Understanding energy poverty requires an understanding 
of the different services that energy can provide, and the 
relationship of each of these to poverty. The energy services 
that are often discussed in relation to poverty can be 
divided into five categories:
 • modern cooking services 
 • household lighting, communications, and electrical appliances
 • energy services demanded by micro or small enterprises
 • energy services demanded by schools and health facilities
 • energy services for industrialisation.5  
Empirical evidence suggests that each type of energy 
service affects human welfare, and therefore fights poverty, 
in different ways. There is also variation in the amount 
and form of energy needed to deliver each service, and 
the technologies available to provide them. In order to 
make broader statements about energy and poverty, it is 
necessary to trace the pathways between the two. 
This section examines how each of these services 
relates to poverty, and the implications of this relationship 
for delivering that service in ways that help poor 
people. Inadequate access to modern cooking technologies, 
which represents the most widespread form of energy 
poverty, is analysed first. The section then considers the 
relationship between electricity and poverty, both in 
terms of basic household access and access for schools 
and primary health clinics. The energy services most 
important to micro- and small-enterprises, which provide 
the primary source of income for low-income households, 
are also explored. The section concludes by exploring the 
relationship between energy, industrialisation and poverty.
2.1 Modern cooking services
2.1.1 Relationship with poverty
Most incidences of energy poverty come in the form of 
lack of access to clean and modern cooking services. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, the vast majority of households cook 
with biomass – either fuelwood in rural areas or more 
energy-dense charcoal in cities – using relatively basic fires 
or stoves, often indoors. Improving energy services related 
to cooking provides welfare benefits to poor households, 
and there are compelling reasons to believe that it also 
improves incomes.
There is copious evidence that modern cooking services 
can improve the welfare of low-income households by 
improving health, particularly by reducing household air 
pollution (Bailis, Ezzati, & Kammen, 2005; WHO, 2014).
The World Health Organization (2014) estimates that 
household air pollution causes around 600,000 premature 
deaths each year in Africa. It also attributes 2.6 per cent of the 
global toll of ill health to household air pollution from solid 
fuels, with nearly all of this proportion found in poor regions 
(Desai, Mehta, & Smith, 2004).6 
The disease burden falls disproportionately upon 
women, who are more exposed than men because they 
tend to spend a greater period of time cooking,7 and on 
children under the age of five, who account for 13 per cent 
of deaths related to household air pollution (WHO, 2014). 
Modern cooking services may also reduce risks to 
personal security during fuelwood collection (Elias & 
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5 In common with much of the energy access community, we do not include energy services related to transportation as part of the ‘energy poverty’ 
discussion. This is something of an arbitrary exclusion, but this paper maintains it so that it can focus on the poverty implications of the various services 
discussed in the energy poverty context.
6 Specific health issues associated with the inhalation of fumes from burning biomass include asthma, chronic obstructive lung disease, acute respiratory 
infections, tuberculosis, perinatal mortality, low birth weight and cataracts (Smith, Samer, Romieu, & Bruce, 2000; WHO, 2002).
7 With the WHO’s recent inclusion of strokes in the list of diseases caused by household air pollution, the number of deaths attributed to the hazard 
increased substantially. However, the strong gender bias against women disappeared as a result, presumably because pollution-induced strokes were more 
prevalent among men.
 Indoor air pollution is the fourth largest 
cause of death worldwide, contributing 
to 4.3 million deaths each year, and is 
the biggest environmental killer, ahead of 
unsafe water and sanitation and diseases 
like HIV/AIDS and malaria (Lim et al., 
2012; WHO, 2014). 
Victor, 2005; Holdren & Smith, 2000) although the 
magnitude of both the risks and their reduction is less clear.
Beyond health benefits, improved access to modern 
cooking technologies can, in principle, reduce income 
poverty by enabling households to make more productive 
use of their time. The IEA (2014) estimates that households 
without modern cooking technologies spend between one 
and five hours every day collecting fuelwood. Improved 
energy access could allow this time to be spent on 
activities such as education or commerce that can increase 
household income (Elias & Victor, 2005). Of course, 
having more time can also have direct benefits for the 
quality of life, regardless of any change in income.
Less directly, improved access to modern cooking 
methods is also thought to benefit the poor by reducing 
deforestation and forest degradation. Wood is renewable 
(and carbon neutral) when harvested at sustainable rates, 
but the rate of today’s overall consumption of biomass for 
cooking is unsustainable. For example, fuelwood collection 
accounts for more than 75 per cent of wood removal 
from forests in sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2010). There 
is, however, some debate on the degree to which biomass 
consumption for cooking leads to deforestation. Generally 
speaking, the wood gathered and used by rural residents 
for personal consumption comes largely from dead trees, 
as they wish to preserve the forest stock. In contrast, the 
wood converted to charcoal for use in urban areas comes 
predominantly from felled trees (Practical Action, 2014). 
Therefore, while fuelwood collection tends to contribute 
to forest degradation, the charcoal industry tends to 
contribute to deforestation. Chidumayo and Gumbo 
(2013) estimated that charcoal production caused 14 per 
cent of total deforestation in sub-Saharan Africa in 2009. 
The impact of deforestation can include the scarcity of 
fuelwood around villages and urban areas, which increases 
the distances people have to travel to find fuelwood and 
the time they have to spend collecting it (IEA, 2014). 
Furthermore, deforestation and forest degradation result 
in increased erosion and reduced watershed maintenance, 
leading to an increase in droughts and floods (Chidumayo 
& Gumbo, 2013), with obvious implications for household 
poverty and well-being.
2.1.2 How do we provide modern cooking services to 
households? 
In general, cooking is the first energy service used by 
households, coming even before lighting. For the poorest 
households, cooking can represent up to 90 per cent 
of their total energy consumption. Improved cooking 
technologies are often described using the metaphor of 
an ‘energy ladder’: with traditional biomass fuels and 
primitive technologies on the lower ‘rungs’, and kerosene, 
liquid petroleum gas (LPG), natural gas and electricity 
(among other energy sources) on the higher rungs. Despite 
its importance for health and expenditures, households 
are slower to change their cooking technology than they 
change other household technologies: ‘[…] traditional fuels 
and technologies tend to exit more slowly than new ones 
arrive; modern transistor radios exist alongside primitive 
cookstoves’ (Elias & Victor, 2005, p. 5).
Among solid fuels, cost appears to be the biggest factor 
in household choices about the cooking technology choices 
along the energy ladder. In general, the cheapest method 
of cooking is the use of efficient cookstoves, charcoal or 
fuelwood. As explained by Sanga and Jannuzzi (2005, p. 
13), ‘Charcoal is the cheapest alternative when compared 
to other commercial fuels and for this reason it will 
continue to be the most preferred cooking fuel for some 
time in the future.’ Table 1 displays the fuel and stove costs 
associated with different methods of cooking in US dollars 
per megajoule (MJ). 
Households continue to cook with solid fuels after 
gaining access to electricity, even in grid-connected areas 
where, in effect, there is unlimited power supply (Figure 
2). This is primarily because of cost: ‘households are 
conscious of the rapidly spinning wheel of the electricity 
meter if a heating ring is turned on’ (World Bank, 2008b, 
p. 33). Cooking is a relatively energy intensive service. It 
takes 0.44 kilowatt hours (kWh) of electricity to bring a 
two litre pot of water to a boil (Eskom, 2010) – enough 
electricity to keep a ceiling fan (25 W), light bulbs (15 
W), and TV (70 W) running for four hours. According 
to Elias and Victor (2005, p. 4), ‘the first kilowatts of 
electricity acquired by households are commonly used for 
lighting, entertainment and communication services, while 
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Table 1. Indicative costs of cooking with different technologies 
Stove 
type
Monthly amortised 
costs of stove [$] 
Useful energy 
cost [$/MJ]
Monthly costs 
for household 
consumption 
of 320 MJ [$]
Firewood n/a 0.031 or free 9.92 or free
Charcoal 
(traditional)
0.051 0.031 9.971
Charcoal 
(efficient)
0.285 0.018 6.045
Kerosene 0.076 0.033 10.64
LPG 0.475 0.05 16.475
Electricity 1.044 0.035 12.244
Source: based on data from Sanga & Januzzi, 2005. Values in this 
table are only indicative and may vary substantially by region and 
over time with changing technologies and fuel prices. The calculations 
by Sanga and Jannuzzi (2005) were based on surveys in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania, in 1990 and 2002; b Note that the costs provided 
for cooking with electricity reflect only those of households already 
connected to the grid. 
many households continue to cook and heat the home 
with traditional fuels long after modern energy enters 
the household.’ In general, households also have capital 
invested in ‘traditional’ cooking technologies, and lack the 
finances to invest in electric stoves that can cost from $100 
to $500 (Elias & Victor, 2005). 
Given the high upfront costs of electric stoves, it is 
more likely that low-income households will shift from 
open-fires and traditional charcoal stoves to other modern 
methods of cooking, such as LPG or kerosene. This is born 
up by the low penetration rates of electric cooking relative 
to electricity access as a whole, shown in Figure 2 below.
Factors other than cost can also play a role in cooking 
choice. Chakrabarti and Chakrabarti (2002) argued that 
the shift to modern cooking services is driven by the desire 
to free up time spent on collecting fuelwood and reduce 
the adverse health effects of household air pollution. 
Sanga and Jannuzzi (2005, p.13) stated that  ‘Charcoal 
substitution by LPG or kerosene will occur not for 
economic reasons, but for individuals’ desire to improve 
quality of life, in the context of modernisation (Sanga & 
Jannuzzi, 2005, p. 13).’ When health benefits and time 
savings are monetised, Jeuland and Pattanayak (2012) 
argue that kerosene and LPG become the most attractive 
options. Further evidence suggests that LPG poses fewer 
health costs than kerosene, making it a more attractive 
option for many.9
Even after they adopt modern cooking technologies, 
households will often engage in ‘fuel stacking’ (the use of 
multiple fuels) as a result of both cultural preferences for 
biomass cooking (people say they prefer the taste of food 
cooked with wood or charcoal) and as a way to address 
the unreliable supply electricity, LPG and kerosene supply 
(Elias & Victor, 2005). Other evidence suggests that a lack 
of consumer education on energy choices could play a 
role, as some people believe that cooking with electricity is 
dangerous (World Bank, 2008b).
As a result of these factors, the push for universal access to 
modern cooking services will be driven much more through 
the diffusion of advanced biomass cookstoves, LPG stoves, 
and biogas systems (IEA, 2011).10 Electricity is predicted to 
play a much smaller role in delivering such services. 
2.2 Basic electricity for households: lighting, communi-
cations and other electrical appliances
2.2.1 Relationship with poverty
The welfare and income benefits of basic electricity 
access at the household level appear to be substantial. 
Even relatively low levels of electricity consumption can 
greatly improve the welfare of low-income households by 
powering lighting and other energy services, such as mobile 
phones, fans, radios, televisions, refrigerators and water 
pumps (GTZ and NL Agency, 2010; Pueyo, Gonzalez, 
Dent, & DeMartino, 2013). 
As seen in Table 2, the quantity of electricity necessary 
to provide these energy services varies. The IEA (2014) uses 
a two-tiered threshold of electricity poverty: 250 kWh of 
electricity per year for rural households, which is enough 
to power a mobile telephone, a fan, and two compact 
fluorescent light bulbs (CFL); and 500 kWh per year for 
urban households, which could, in addition, power a 
refrigerator, a second mobile phone and another appliance.11 
These may seem, at first glance, to be a meagre set of 
appliances that can be powered by a relatively low level 
of service, especially to those are already accustomed to 
plentiful electricity. Indeed, critiques sometimes imply that 
a focused on the delivery of electricity in the 250 or 500 
kWh range somehow ‘caps’ electricity services and thereby 
precludes users from ever obtaining more electricity. Why 
focus on a mini-fridge, for example, when a bigger fridge 
would be far nicer? When measured against the energy 
services that very poor people are consuming already, 
however, even relatively small amounts of power can 
deliver material services. 
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8 The data for this figure range from 1999 to 2005.
9 Kerosene use presents the risks of toxic emissions, burns, and ingestion, particularly among children.
10 However, because of the predominantly extensive (rather than intensive) livestock systems in Africa, and the frequent scarcity of water, it is likely that 
biogas will play a more marginal role than the LPG and advanced biomass cookstoves. We were unable to find comparable data on the costs of cooking 
with biogas systems.
11 Both of these thresholds assume a household of five individuals. The IEA does not explain its justification for the differentiation between rural and urban 
households. Presumably, it is based on differences in consumption levels once electricity access is attained.
Figure 2. Proportion of those with electricity who use it  for 
cooking
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Source: data from World Bank, 2008b.
The value that poor people place on basic energy 
services is illustrated by their willingness to pay for them. 
The hundreds of millions of households in Africa that lack 
electricity do not sit idly in the dark. Instead, they fulfill 
their lighting needs with a variety of technologies including 
candles, simple wick lanterns and numerous types of oil 
lamps. Evidence suggests that poor households often only 
use electricity for a few final consumption-related purposes, 
especially immediately after gaining access. As noted by a 
World Bank (2008b) study, ‘Lighting and TV account for at 
least 80 per cent of rural electricity consumption and thus 
the bulk of the benefits delivered by electrification.’ 
These technologies may not lead directly to an increase 
in income, but the World Bank (2008b) has found that they 
do have substantial welfare benefits. In a review of nine 
rural electrification programmes, including some in Ghana 
and Senegal, the World Bank (2008b) found that increased 
access to TV and radio increased knowledge about health 
and contraception, which, in turn, improved health 
outcomes and reduced fertility rates. Access to electricity 
was associated with reduction in fertility rates by 1.06 
children per family in Ghana and 2.00 in Senegal. Child 
nutritional status also improved with electricity access, but 
the causal mechanisms are not fully understood in this case. 
Furthermore, the World Bank (2008b) found that 
electricity access was associated with an increase in the 
number of years that children spend in school. Two 
potential explanations are provided for this relationship. 
First, there is evidence that the presence of household 
electricity in rural areas attracts more effective teachers, 
encouraging students to stay in school for longer (or 
enabling them to, through improvements in their grades) 
(Cabraal, Barnes, & Agarwal, 2005). Electricity within the 
schools themselves is important, and addressed in Section 
2.3 below. Second, electric lighting allows students to study 
during the evening, resulting in better grades and, again, 
more time spent in school. Indeed, the World Bank (2008b) 
found that access to electric lighting increased the reading/
studying time of children and adults by an average of 77 
minutes and 27 minutes respectively per household per day 
– but only if they chose to study and read. Otherwise, it 
had no significant impact. In some cases, access to electric 
lighting even led to less reading and studying.  
While welfare improvements alone justify prioritising 
the reduction of energy poverty, there is strong evidence 
that household electricity access could also reduce 
income poverty, given households’ inelastic demand for 
basic services like lighting and mobile phone charging. 
Final consumption of modern forms of energy can allow 
households to reallocate resources that were once spent on 
these energy services to more productive uses.  
Surveys conducted by the Lighting Africa (2011) 
programme in Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Zambia 
revealed that a typical off-grid household in these countries 
will spend $57 annually on fuel and lantern costs. 
Furthermore, a large and growing number of households 
lack access to electricity, but do have a mobile phone. In 
Kenya, for example, only 15 per cent of households have 
electricity, but over 50 per cent have mobile phones (Legros, 
Havet, Bruce, & Bonjour, 2009). These households often 
pay to charge up their phones (and people often walk many 
kilometres to do so). In rural Uganda, the price for charging 
a mobile was UGX 500 ($0.17) per charge in 2010. At 
two charges per week, this represents a further cost of 
$17.68 per year (Hogarth, 2012). A rough estimate would, 
therefore, put a rural household’s total annual expenditure 
Table 2. Indicative consumption of different household 
electricity appliances
Appliance Power 
(watts)
Daily 
use
(hours)
Daily Yearly 
Mobile 
phone
4 2 0.08 29.2
Each light 20 5 0.1 36.5
Fan 50 5 0.25 91.25
Microwave 1000 0.25 0.25 91.25
TV 70 3 0.21 76.65
Laptop 
computer
100 4 0.4 146
Desktop 
computer
150 4 0.6 219
Kettle 1500 0.5 0.75 273.75
Mini fridge 150 12 0.75 273.75
Small water 
pump
200 6 1.2 438
Electric hob 1500 1 1.5 547.5
Water heater 500 3 1.5 547.5
Source: Appliance wattage was sourced from a variety of different 
online sources. Values should be considered as indicative only. Energy 
consumption will vary according to the efficiency of the devices and 
the hours of use per day.
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Mills and Jacobson (2011) estimated that 
the world’s off-grid households spend 
approximately $40 billion per year on 
lighting – around 20 per cent of all 
global lighting expenditures – but receive 
only 0.1 per cent of the lighting service 
consumed by the electrified world in 
total. 
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on services that could be provided through electricity access 
at around $75. To put this in perspective, in Uganda, a 
D.Light Nova solar lantern with a mobile phone charging 
function costs UGX 95,000 ($31.93) (Hogarth, 2012). 
Given these potential savings, improved household 
electricity access could free up significant income. 
Improved electricity access is also thought to reduce 
income poverty by enabling the consumption of new 
energy services that raise the productivity of household 
labour and capital. For example, the education benefits 
associated with household electricity access can, in theory, 
increase income levels, because education has proven links 
with lifetime earnings (Cabraal, et al., 2005).  
It is a compelling story, but proving that it is true is 
more challenging. While there is a strong correlation 
between income levels and electricity consumption, 
the direction of causality is complex. The relationship 
is attributable, in part, to the fact that a relaxation of 
household budgetary constraints fuels demand for new 
energy services such as entertainment, refrigeration and 
other higher-wattage uses (Elias & Victor, 2005). 
A ‘light bulb in a hut’, therefore, does far more than 
shine a light on poverty.  That small amount of electricity 
can signal a dramatic shift in direct well-being, a major 
cost saving and, in all likelihood, a productivity boost.
2.2.2 How do we provide electricity to new 
households?
There are three broad technological options to provide 
electricity to homes: (1) grid extension, (2) mini-grids and 
(3) off-grid (stand-alone) systems. Very often, options 2 
and 3 are the most cost-effective for providing the levels 
of electricity required by rural households, given the high 
costs of extending the electricity grid. Figure 3, from the 
IEA (2014), provides an indicative estimate of the cost of 
providing one megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity from 
different on-grid, mini-grid and off-grid technologies in 
sub-Saharan Africa. It shows that the cost of providing 
electricity access through grid connections depends on how 
far the grid must be extended. 
The on-grid costs on the left of Figure 3 do not reflect 
the cost of connecting a household to the electricity grid 
or internal wiring, and the value given for the cost of 
extending the electricity grid is sometimes substantially 
higher. Szabó et al. (2011) examined the cost of providing 
electricity access across Africa, and found that ‘[…] in cities 
where the grid already exists, the cost of a connection 
may start at €140 [$153], while in areas where there is no 
grid, construction and connection costs can exceed €1050 
[$1149] and the extension cost [per km] can be ten times 
these values.’
The infrastructure for transmission and distribution in 
sub-Saharan Africa is sparse, as is the region’s population. 
Almost 60 per cent of its people live in rural areas and 
with just 36.9 inhabitants per km2, its population density 
is less than one-third that of Europe’s (Mandelli, Barbieri, 
Mattarolo, & Colombo, 2014). Belward et al. (2011) 
concluded, ‘In areas where household density is low (<50 
cap/km2), any investment in larger grid infrastructure 
would never be cost competitive.’ 
For this reason, the IEA (2011) estimates that, although 
grid connections are preferable for all urban residents, only 
Figure 3. Indicative levelised costs of electricity for on-grid, 
mini-grid and off-grid technologies in sub-Saharan Africa, 
2012 
Costs of grid extension are calculated as the average of extending the 
medium-voltage grid a certain distance (e.g. 1km) to each community 
on a levelised cost basis.
Notes: costs are indicative and could vary significantly depending 
on local conditions such as electricity tariffs, population density and 
the delivered cost of diesel. The quality of service for the different 
technologies also varies: additional investment in batteries or back-up 
power may be needed to compensate for the variability of renewables 
or intermittent grid supply. O&M = operation and maintenance. 
Source: IEA, 2014, p. 128.
30 per cent of unelectrified homes in rural areas would 
be most cost-effectively served through centralised grids. 
A forthcoming ODI paper estimates that 48 per cent of 
the people in the region who will not have electricity as of 
2030 would be served most economically by an extension 
of the grid (Scott, forthcoming). Over half would best 
be served through mini-grids (34 per cent) and off-grid 
systems (18 per cent). 
A study by the European Commission Joint Research 
Council (JRC) found distributed electricity technologies 
to be the most cost-effective option for electricity access 
for an even higher proportion of households. The study 
developed a spatial electricity cost model to determine the 
most economical option for providing electricity to different 
areas (Figure 4). Based on this analysis, the study found that 
only 39 per cent of the population would be served most 
economically through grid extension, and the remaining 
61 per cent would be best served by off-grid and mini-grid 
systems (Szabó, Bodis, Huld, & Moner-Girona, 2011). 
This figure does not reflect, however, the potential 
synergies between different technologies. For example, 
to deal with the intermittent nature of wind and solar 
power, mini-grids often combine these sources with 
diesel generators to ensure a reliable supply of electricity. 
Households, in contrast, generally address the problem of 
intermittent supply by using car batteries.
These two studies are also likely to underestimate the 
proportion of the population that would best be served by 
mini-grid or off-grid technologies. There are two reasons for 
this: first, the capital cost of renewable energy technologies 
(except hydro) has been falling in recent years. Figure 6 
shows the dramatic decline in the price of solar PV electricity 
– a trend that is expected to continue (Carbon Tracker 
Initiative, 2014). If it continues to fall, any utility-scale 
generation and distribution infrastructure projects that begin 
now will have to compete against even lower renewable 
energy prices by the time these projects come online.
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Of the households that would be supplied 
most economically through off-grid and 
mini-grid  systems, according to IEA 
and the JRC estimates, renewable energy 
technologies – including solar PV, wind, 
biomass, and micro-hydro – would be the 
most cost-effective sources of electricity 
for between 67.1 and 75.4 per cent 
(Figure 5). 
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Figure 4. Most economical source of energy by area 
Source: (Szabó, Bodis, Huld, Pinedo, et al., 2011).
Figure 5. Sources of electricity for off-grid and mini-grid 
systems (percentage of MWh by source) 
Second, as discussed above, the IEA data do not consider 
the costs of connecting individual households to the grid. 
Even those households in close proximity to the electricity 
grid may find the cost of connection beyond their reach. As 
a result, grid connection tends to occur regressively, with 
better-off households connected first and reaping most of 
the benefits from grid expansion (Pachauri, Scott, Scott, & 
Shepherd, 2013; World Bank, 2008b). Governments could 
subsidise the connection charges, but, given their limited 
finances, there is generally a trade-off between subsidising 
pro-poor grid connections and investing in further grid 
expansion. The high costs also mean that grid connection 
tends to occur over a long time period. A World Bank 
(2008b, p. xv) study found, ‘Even in villages that have been 
connected for 15-20 years, it is not uncommon for from 20 
to 25 per cent of households to remain unconnected.’ Even 
when they are connected, the tariffs for electricity may 
remain too high for households living on very low incomes 
(African Progress Panel, forthcoming). 
This is not to say that low-income households are 
not willing or able to pay for electricity. As discussed, 
unelectrified households already spend a significant 
portion of their income on lighting and charging their 
mobile phones. Rather, it indicates that solar lanterns or 
smaller PV systems are often more affordable options for 
such households, even in urban areas. This also means 
that policies that facilitate small incremental shifts of 
energy consumption to poor people may, in reality, be 
more progressive, rather than, as they are so often labelled 
– ‘under-ambitious.’
2.3 Energy services for schools and healthcare facilities
2.3.1 Relationship with poverty
Education and healthcare, both considered essential for 
poverty reduction, can be improved tremendously by 
electricity access. As mentioned, electricity access for 
households, schools, and health facilities can help to attract 
and retain qualified teachers and medical professionals 
(Cabraal, et al., 2005; Practical Action, 2014; World Bank, 
2008b). Beyond this benefit, the energy services that are 
enabled when schools and health clinics gain access to 
electricity can be vital to their effective functioning. 
Electricity can improve schools through better lighting; 
the use of fans to control temperature; more efficient 
administration through computers and other information 
and communication technology (ICT); and tuition that is 
enhanced by a variety of different electrical appliances. 
Practical Action (2013), however, has estimated that 65 per 
cent of primary schools in sub-Saharan Africa, accounting 
for a total of 90 million pupils, lack access to electricity. 
There are wide variations in the proportion of primary 
schools without electricity, from just over 10 per cent in 
South Africa to 98 per cent in Burundi.
In Africa, not only has education been demonstrated to 
increase income levels, it has also been shown to have a 
positive impact on other indicators of development: health, 
female participation in politics, and political stability 
(Gyimah-Brempong, 2010). 
There are also strong links between healthcare and 
poverty reduction. Ill health can reduce earning capacity 
and entail significant costs for treatment, sometimes 
driving a household below the income poverty line. 
The poor account for a disproportionate share of those 
burdened with disease, and this is, in part, because of the 
failure of health services to reach them (Wagstaff, 2002). 
Electricity can improve the services delivered by all health 
facilities tremendously. Basic health facilities – the kind 
that are the most important for poverty reduction – have 
electricity demands that differ from those of larger clinics 
and hospitals. Small clinics or health posts in rural areas 
demand electricity for lighting; for ICT for administration, 
information, and aftercare services and for laboratory 
equipment and for refrigeration, which is particularly 
important for the storage of vaccines, blood and other 
medical supplies. Larger clinics, of the type found more 
commonly in medium-sized towns and cities, while requiring 
electricity for all of these purposes, also need it for more 
energy-demanding medical equipment, such as ultrasound 
and X-ray machines, equipment for HIV/AIDS diagnosis, 
and incubators for premature babies (USAID, n.d.).
Smaller, less energy intensive health facilities are the 
most important for poverty reduction. Despite this, over 
30 per cent of all health facilities in sub-Saharan African, 
serving approximately 255 million people, lack electricity. 
In Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, only 42 per cent and 
50 per cent have electricity (Practical Action, 2013).   
2.3.2 How do we provide electricity for schools and 
healthcare facilities?
Schools, health clinics and hospitals require higher 
quantities of electricity than households, but many of these 
services still benefit from electricity supply in relatively 
small increments, which can be delivered by a range 
of technologies.The (USAID, n.d., p. 5) provided two 
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Figure 6. Indicative levelised costs of solar PV electricity 
over time, and estimated lowest utility-scale costs
Source: Carbon Tracker Initiative, 2014, p. 40.
scenarios for the supply of electricity to health clinics of 
different sizes in Africa using electricity from different 
sources. Their data can be used to consider, in particular, 
the demands of education and health services that focus on 
poor people.
The first scenario featured a health clinic with up to 
60 beds that used electricity for lighting, limited surgical 
procedures (e.g. suturing), refrigeration and basic 
laboratory equipment – the type of facility that can be seen 
as typical of those found in rural areas of sub-Saharan 
Africa.12 USAID calculated that the electricity needs of such 
a clinic ranged from 5 to 10 kWh per day. 
Practical Action (2013) estimated that the electricity 
needs for a 60-bed rural clinic would be similar to those for 
a primary school with approximately 100 students and four 
classrooms, at around 5 kWh per day. 
The school would use electricity for lighting, electric 
fans and basic ICT including a stereo and computer for 
administrative purposes. 
Figure 7 compares the cumulative fuel, maintenance, and 
technology costs of supplying 5 kWh of electricity per day using 
different technological options over a 20-year time period. 
It shows that over this time period off-grid technologies – 
wind solar, or hybrid diesel-solar systems – tend to be more 
cost effective than the electricity grid in providing 5 kWh 
per day (or 1,825 kWh per year) to schools and small clinics 
in rural areas that are more than 3.2 km from the electricity 
grid. 
USAID’s (n.d., p. 5) second scenario examined the 
energy needs of a larger clinic (120 beds or more) 
that would make significant use of ICT and possess 
sophisticated devices such as X-ray machines and other 
diagnostic machinery. It estimated that such a facility 
would demand 20-30 kWh per day, because of its higher-
powered medical devices.
For this quantity of energy, grid extension would 
more commonly be the most economical option for the 
delivery of the electricity. Realistically, however, such a 
facility would not be located in rural areas away from 
the electricity grid. It would be located in towns or cities, 
12 In fact, it is more accurate to say a 60-bed clinic is well beyond the facilities of most rural clinics throughout much of Africa, but represents an ideal 
scenario for the delivery of rural health services, and is, therefore, a ‘generous’ estimate of electricity demands.
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Figure 7. Comparison of technological options to supply 5 kWh per day or 1825 kWh per year
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and could serve as ‘regional referral center and coordinate 
communication between several smaller facilities and 
hospitals in large cities’ (USAID, n.d.).
2.4 Energy services for micro and small enterprises
2.4.1 Relationship with poverty?
Though definitions for micro and small enterprises vary, 
the terms are used in this paper to refer to those enterprises 
that rely primarily on family or household members. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture and micro and small 
enterprises (largely informal) represent the largest source 
of employment.13 Therefore, their production levels are tied 
intrinsically to rates of income poverty.
The energy needs of such enterprises vary substantially 
across different types of economic activities. It is reasonable, 
for the sake of simplicity, to categorise these enterprises 
within agriculture, services, and manufacturing sectors.14   
Agriculture uses energy during land preparation, 
planting and transplanting, weed control, harvesting, 
transport and irrigation. In sub-Saharan Africa, these 
processes are still powered primarily by human labour 
(Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2002).
Modern energy services have been seen to greatly 
improve the productivity and dependability of crops 
(Cabraal, et al., 2005). Irrigation pumps, for example, 
could lengthen the growing season and end the need to 
fetch water and irrigate fields by hand (Practical Action, 
2012). Land that has irrigated systems is, in general, more 
than twice as productive as non-irrigated land, yet only 
4 per cent of agricultural land is thought to be under 
irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2008a). 
Refrigerators and food dryers could reduce the waste of 
agricultural produce. Finally, mechanised land preparation, 
planting and harvesting could replace human traction as 
the dominant source of energy in agriculture (Karekezi & 
Kithyoma, 2002). 
Even where energy supply can improve agricultural 
productivity, however, it will be only one element among 
a range of more complex interventions. There is evidence 
suggesting diminishing returns to energy inputs in 
agriculture, and that excessive inputs (i.e. mechanisation) 
may reduce employment and have harmful consequences for 
the environment (Practical Action, 2012). Complicating the 
issue still further, a growing body of evidence suggests that, 
in some contexts, non-mechanised agricultural techniques 
such as no-till systems, which consume less energy and have 
more labour inputs, can often be more productive.  
Enterprises in the services sector have energy needs that 
are qualitatively similar, but often larger, than the needs of 
households. They include services such as lighting, batteries, 
mobile phones, computers, radios, televisions, sewing 
machines and refrigerators. Restaurants also demand heat 
energy for cooking (Practical Action, 2012). 
In the manufacturing sector, enterprises are often more 
energy intensive and often require heat energy (brewing, 
baking, and pottery) and motive power (woodworking and 
construction tools, grain mills, and other agro-processing 
machinery) (Karekezi, Kimani, & Onguru, 2008). 
There is anecdotal evidence that improvements in 
electricity access can increase the productivity of micro 
and small enterprises outside of agriculture. James et al. 
(1999) found that electrified stores in Namibia were able 
to stay open longer while spending, on average, less money 
on lighting and refrigeration than non-electrified stores. 
In Mali, the United Nations Development Programme 
found that improved access to electricity allowed women 
to increase production of shea butter by over 300 per 
cent (from 3 kg to 10 kg per day) in one community and 
between 35-45 per cent in another (UNDP, 2004).  
Statistically, firms with access to electricity tend to have 
higher productivity than firms without. However, access to 
electricity seems have a lower impact on the productivity 
of micro enterprises than on small or medium ones, as it 
appears that smaller enterprises are more likely to adapt 
to unreliable electricity through more labour inputs than 
through the purchase of expensive back-up generators 
(Grimm, Hartwig, & Lay, 2011; Scott, Darko, Lemma, & 
Rud, 2014; World Bank, 2008b). 
There is also statistical evidence that households with 
electricity are more likely to receive an income from a 
micro enterprise. However, these benefits tend to accrue in 
a regressive manner, with wealthier households receiving 
a higher boost in income than households that are poorer 
(Pachauri, et al., 2013). In Bangladesh, for example, 
Khandker et al. (2009) found that  while electrification 
increased household incomes by 12.2 per cent on average, 
the impact on the poorest households was negligible. 
Pachauri et al. (2013) argued that the regressive 
distribution of the income benefits of electrification 
indicates that access to electricity alone is not enough to 
drive growth in production or the formation of new micro  
and small enterprises. If low-income households are to 
take advantage of the productive opportunities created 
by improved electricity access, electricity provision often 
needs to be combined with other interventions that aim 
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13 Agriculture represents over half of all employment, and, according to the International Labour Organisation (2002), informal employment represents 
72% of non-agricultural related employment in sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2002). 
14 Common services include small shops, restaurants, guesthouses, beer halls, mechanical and electrical repair workshops and mobile phone and battery 
charging centres. Manufacturing enterprises include pottery, weaving, brick making, charcoal production, soap making, beer brewing, leather treatment, 
bakeries, candle wax manufacturing, tinsmiths, blacksmiths, saw mills, grain mills, edible oil processing, fish smoking, dairy processing, tobacco curing 
and other agro-processing enterprises (Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2002).
to, for example, improve access to markets, road and 
communications infrastructure, as well as the introduction 
of electrical machinery and tools. When such interventions 
were included in combination with a community-owned 
and managed diesel-powered mini-grid in Mpeketoni 
village, Kenya, the productivity per worker and the gross 
revenues of carpentry and tailoring microenterprises 
increased by over 200 per cent. As people were paid on 
the basis of their production, their incomes increased 
accordingly (Kirubi, Jacobson, Kammen, & Mills, 2009; 
Pachauri, et al., 2013).
2.4.2 How do we deliver energy services to micro and 
small enterprises? 
As seen in the previous section, the energy services demanded 
by micro and small enterprises vary significantly between 
agriculture, services, and manufacturing sectors. A variety of 
different technologies are available to meet these demands.
Regarding agriculture, one of the most important 
energy services demanded is water pumping for irrigation. 
Electricity offers one option to power irrigation pumps, 
and where available, grid-connections can provide the 
source. However, there are also a number of options 
that do not require electricity. In fact, depending on the 
proximity and depth of the water source, human-powered 
treadle pumps are generally the cheapest option for small-
scale subsistence agriculture at $100-300. Small, motorised 
pumps powered by petrol or diesel are also relatively 
competitive, at $250 plus fuel costs, and are becoming 
increasingly common. Likewise, solar PV powered pumps 
offer an increasingly competitive alternative. Given their 
high capital costs, these are typically implemented by 
groups of farmers, rather than individuals (Burney, Naylor, 
& Postel, 2013).15 
The mechanisation of the land preparation, planting 
and harvesting process requires tractors, rotovators, 
rototillers and threshing machines powered by petrol- and 
diesel-fuelled internal combustion engines (not to mention 
material, political and legal changes to, for example, 
property law and land use policy). However, as discussed 
in the previous section, non-mechanised systems such as 
no-till agriculture, are more productive per hectare in some 
contexts (IFAD and UNEP, 2013).
In the services sector, as discussed, electricity-related 
services such as lighting and ICT can be fulfilled largely by off-
grid and mini-grid technologies as well as grid connections. 
For restaurants, biogas digesters, LPG stoves and improved 
institutional biomass cookstoves offer clean and affordable 
methods of modern cooking (Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2002).
Enterprises that demand heat energy for such activities as 
charcoal-making, brewing, baking and pottery-making meet 
these needs primarily by burning biomass (Practical Action, 
2012). There are significant opportunities for greater fuel 
efficiency through the use of more efficient kilns and boilers 
in micro- and small-scale pottery, charcoal production and 
agro-processing industries. For example, the prevailing 
method of converting fuelwood to charcoal uses earth-
mound kilns, which have a highly inefficient conversion 
rate of 8 per cent to 12 per cent. Industrial kilns have a 
conversion rate of over 25 per cent but are less popular 
because of their high upfront costs, and because they 
increase the unit costs of charcoal production (IEA, 2014).  
For the other small enterprises that require motive power, 
and that are commonplace in rural parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, the cost-effective supply of that power is context 
specific, with a vast range in the quantity of energy they 
demand. Basic woodworking and construction equipment 
ranges in power from around 750 to 1200 W, which is 
within the range of solar PV systems. The energy demand 
of small agro-processing enterprises, on the other hand, is 
often higher than 10 kW (Karekezi & Kithyoma, 2002). 
This quantity of energy is typically beyond the capacity 
of affordable solar PV systems. Where available, however, 
wind and micro-hydro technologies offer attractive 
options to fulfill these energy needs, both for electrical and 
mechanical power. Where none of these technologies are 
available, then diesel generators (and grid connections if in 
close proximity) are generally the most cost-effective.
2.5 Energy services for industrialisation 
2.5.1 Relationship between industrialisation and 
poverty
Energy is also an indispensable input for many energy 
services that are thought to be necessary for the macro-
economic growth that is driven by industrialisation. 
Industrialisation is thought to reduce poverty in two ways. 
Most directly, the jobs created through the increased 
15 For example, Burney et al. (2010) compared the costs of implementing a PV and diesel powered irrigation system for a 0.5 hectare garden in Benin. The 
garden was split between 40 farmers, each with 120 m2 plots. The PV system cost $18,000 while the diesel system cost $9,000 with fuel costs of $684 to 
$2,053 per annum.
16 Mining operations include those in Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Namibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Zambia.
17 Refining operations include those in Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia.
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‘Since 2000, two out of every three 
dollars invested in sub-Saharan African 
energy has gone to produce energy for 
export.’ IEA.
Sources: IEA, 2014; Practical Action, 2012.
 18 Aluminium smelting at the Mozal plant accounts for half of Mozambique’s energy demand. 
19 In 2013 $.
productivity of larger firms can enable households to work 
their way out of poverty. Less directly, the wealth created 
by industrialisation can be mobilised as public revenue for 
spending on social services, employment programmes, cash 
transfers and other ‘equalising’ policies.
This is a compelling narrative, as industrialization has 
been effective in reducing poverty in many parts of the 
world. However, just as some forms of industrialization 
can create jobs and expand the tax base, other forms are 
associated with inequality and the persistence of poverty. In 
Africa, the track record on industrialization is mixed, at best.
The largest existing industries in Africa are the 
extractives, particularly minerals16 and hydrocarbons.17 
Fossil-fuel production is so dominant in the regional 
economy that, according to the IEA (2014, p. 161), ‘Since 
2000, two out of every three dollars invested in sub-Saharan 
African energy has gone to produce energy for export.’ 
Other energy intensive industries include cement production, 
led by the Dangote plant in Nigeria; petrochemical 
production in South Africa and Nigeria; aluminium 
smelting, led by the Mozal plant in Mozambique18; iron 
and steel production in South Africa; and the automotive 
industry in South Africa. Overall, there are few actual 
manufacturing operations in the region at present.
The empirical evidence on the impact of 
industrialisation on poverty reduction is complicated 
(Fredderke & Bogetic, 2006; Scott, et al., 2014). There has 
been the odd success story: the prudent and transparent 
management of revenues from diamond mining in 
Botswana has been credited with reducing the proportion 
of people living in poverty rates from one third to one fifth 
over the past two decades (IEA, 2014). 
There have, however, been many failures. In 2013, fiscal 
revenues from hydrocarbon extraction in sub-Saharan 
Africa totalled over $100 billion. Almost half of these were 
levied in Nigeria, the region’s largest economy, where they 
represented over 75 per cent of the government’s budget. 
Cumulative revenues from oil export in Nigeria have 
amounted to over $1 trillion19 since 1980 (IEA, 2014). Yet, 
despite the windfall to public coffers, Nigeria performs 
no better than the average sub-Saharan African country 
on human development indicators ranging from life 
expectancy to education levels. Experiences like Nigeria’s 
led the IEA (2014, p. 162) to conclude: 
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Figure 8. Average employment percentage per sector versus average GDP percentage in 11 sub-Saharan African countries, and 
proportion of energy and electricity consumption for productive purposes across sub-Saharan Africa
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“Sub-Saharan Africa has ample energy resources, both 
fossil fuels and renewable, but the opportunities that 
these offer to support sustained economic growth 
are often missed. A glaring example is the way that 
deficiencies in essential infrastructure in many countries 
are perpetrated by inefficient or corrupt misuse of 
revenues from fossil fuel extraction.”
Industrial growth in Africa has also created relatively 
few jobs. Figure 8 compares the contributions that the 
industry, agriculture, and services sectors each make to 
GDP, employment, and the total energy and electricity 
consumed for productive purposes. While industry 
is represented by large corporations, much of the 
employment in the agriculture and services sectors comes 
from the micro and small enterprises discussed in the 
previous section. 
As seen, while industry and agriculture provide similar 
contributions to GDP, agriculture employs more than seven 
times as many people. Also, and of particular importance 
to this paper, the amount of energy and electricity 
consumed by each sector does not correspond with its 
contribution to GDP or employment. The energy consumed 
by industry represents far fewer jobs than the energy 
consumed by the agriculture and services sectors. 
Industrialization may be crucial to sustain poverty 
reductions over the long-term – particularly if it is based 
on manufacturing, which has driven poverty reduction 
through job creation in other regions. Extractives-led 
industrialization in Africa has had a comparatively weak 
relationship with poverty reduction. For this relationship to 
be improved many steps are required that are unrelated to 
the expansion of energy capacity. For example, under the 
existing extractives-heavy industrial model, it will depend 
on governments implementing progressive fiscal policies 
and states possessing the technical capacity to provide 
efficient management and service delivery. A transition to 
a new industrial model, on the other hand, would require 
additional industrial policy to usher in a transition to new 
growth sectors. More broadly, it would also likely depend 
on governments being held accountable to low-income 
households to avoid the capture of the benefits by the elite. 
Harnessing industrialisation for poverty reduction is a 
worthwhile policy goal. Focusing on energy services for 
industry, as a route to poverty reduction, may warrant 
more careful consideration when it is contingent on 
a much broader transformation (and given that other 
energy services are tied more closely to poverty reduction). 
This is all the more striking when (as shown in Figure 8) 
agriculture and services may drive growth and employment-
based poverty reduction more effectively. Meanwhile, 
expanding capacity associated with the demands of 
industrialization, by all forecasts, fails to deliver actual 
energy services directly to poor people, either through direct 
access to households or even through community services 
and benefits to micro and small enterprises.
2.5.2 How do we provide energy for industrial energy 
services?
The relationship between energy supply and industry 
becomes clearer when we analyse how energy services 
are delivered to industry, as we have done with other 
energy services. Of the energy consumed for productive 
purposes, industry consumes approximately 70 per cent, 
or 66 million tonnes-of-oil-equivalent. Figure 9 provides 
a breakdown of the different sources of this energy 
consumption across all productive purposes. More than 
half of this consumption occurs in only two countries: 
South Africa (41 per cent) and Nigeria (19 per cent). 
Notably, only 22 per cent of all energy for productive 
purposes comes from electricity. Large-scale production in 
mining, refining, cement, and iron and steel – all of them 
of particular importance in sub-Saharan Africa – requires 
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Table 3. Total installed capacity and key indicators for sub-
Saharan African power pools
CAPP 
2009
EAPP 
2008
WAPP 
2010 
SAPP 
2010
Installed 
capacity (GW)
6.07 28.37 14.09 49.88
Hydropower 
share
86% 24% 30% 17%
Thermal share 14% 73% 70% 83%
kW/1000 
habitants
49 74 54 311
Source: Mandelli et al., 2014, p.662.
Table 4. Sub-Saharan Africa’s renewable electricity 
generation potential in TWh/year and as a share of current 
total final consumption of electricity (% TFC*) for each region 
Middle 
Africa
Eastern 
Africa
Western 
Africa
Southern 
Africa
% 
TFC
% 
TFC
% 
TFC
TWh
/year
% 
TFC
Wind 120 688 394 852 416
Solar 915 3128
Hydro 578 105 292 26 13
Biomass 642 64 178 96 47
0 0 88 198 0 0 0 0
Source: Mandelli et al., 2014, pp. 665-666. * TFC = Total final 
consumption.
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significant motive power and heat energy for industrial 
processes. Across the region, this energy is supplied largely 
through the combustion of biomass, coal, oil, and, to a 
lesser extent, natural gas. The IEA (2014) New Policies 
Scenario projects that consumption of fossil fuels for 
productive uses will increase by 96 per cent in sub-Saharan 
Africa by 2040, while consumption of biomass will 
increase by 123 per cent. 
While electricity accounts for only a small part of 
industry’s total energy demand, industrial is still the 
greatest source of such demand and consumed most of 
Africa’s supply. As seen in Figure 10 (overleaf), extractive 
industries, in particular, consume an overwhelming 
proportion of the power produced in many sub-Saharan 
African countries (Banerjee, Romo, McMahon, Toledano, 
& Robinson, 2014). Individual industrial plants dominate 
consumption in some countries: the Mozal aluminium 
smelter alone accounts for over half of all electricity 
consumed in Mozambique. Industry’s demand for 
electricity in sub-Saharan Africa is projected to double 
between now and 2040 (IEA, 2014). 
In general, industrial processes require a stable 
baseload supply and a larger quantity of electricity 
than can be provided through small-scale off-grid 
renewable technologies alone. For this reason, most 
electricity consumed by industry is supplied through grid 
connections. Castellano et al. (2015) estimated that the 
self-generation of electricity (primarily through diesel-
fuelled generators) accounted for 10 per cent of industrial 
20 Note that Egypt contributes 78% of generating capacity in EAPP, and South Africa contributes 82% of generating capacity in SAPP.
Figure 9. Mix of energy used for productive purposes, 2012 
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Bioenergy
Source: IEA, 2014
Coal
Oil
Gas
Electricity
Bioenergy
electricity demand in 2010, and projected that this will 
decline to 7 per cent by 2040. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, utility-scale electricity is 
transmitted and distributed primarily through national 
utilities. Four power pools provide the potential for 
transboundary transmission: (1) the Central African 
Power Pool (CAPP), (2) the Eastern Africa Power Pool 
(EAPP), (3) the West Africa Power Pool (WAPP), and (4) 
the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP). Although little 
transboundary trade occurs, the power pools offer a useful 
unit for regional analysis. The installed capacity of each 
power pool is displayed in Table 3.20 While hydropower 
contributes a significant share of the power produced in 
the regions with the most current and projected industrial 
production – West and Southern Africa – the electricity 
grids are dominated by fossil-fuelled thermal generation 
(Mandelli, et al., 2014).
Technically, it is possible for the entire current and 
projected industrial electricity demand of sub-Saharan 
Africa to be met through renewable energy. Mandelli 
et al. (2014, p. 666) argued that wind, solar, hydro and 
biomass resources are so abundant in Africa that each 
one of them could supply the entire continent’s electricity 
demand. Table 4 provides estimates of the potential of each 
renewable electricity source. Each sub-region has at least 
one renewable resource in extreme abundance: solar in 
Southern, West, and Eastern Africa; wind in Eastern Africa; 
and hydro and biomass in Western Africa (Mandelli, et 
al., 2014, p. 665). Despite this potential, in the IEA’s New 
Policies Scenario over half the supply is projected to come 
from fossil fuels in 2040, and over a quarter from coal 
power alone (IEA, 2014).
Of course, this analysis of delivering industrial energy 
focuses on the demands under a ‘business-as-usual’ 
scenario.  In this context, it is worth noting once again 
that the extractives-heavy industrial sector in Africa is 
particularly energy intensive. In the larger discussion 
of Africa’s industrialisation, it is important to note that 
alternative industrialisation models will have different 
energy demands, and that these may be met by an array of 
technologies and energy systems.
Figure 10. Mining demand as percentage of total non-mining demand for electricity 
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Source: Banerjee et al., 2014, p. 9.
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3. Implications for universal 
and sustainable energy 
access
The analysis outlined in the previous sections lead to three 
main conclusions about the energy access agenda:
 • Tackling energy poverty will have less to do with ambitious 
expansion of electricity capacity, and more to do with 
ambitious distribution of energy services to poor people.
 • Expansion in centralised power generation serves 
industry, the services sector and already-connected 
households, before it serves the poor.
 • Distributed, clean energy interventions are best suited to 
tackling energy poverty – and poverty more generally.
3.1 Tackling energy poverty will have less to do with 
ambitious expansion of electricity capacity, and more to 
do with ambitious distribution of energy services to poor 
people
Energy poverty and its inverse, energy access, pose specific 
and pernicious challenges that will not be resolved as a 
byproduct of the expansion of generation capacity or even 
by the expansion of capacity plus electrification. 
This conclusion has emerged from analysis of what it 
would take to deliver basic energy access. For the most 
part, improving basic electricity access does not result in 
modern cooking services, even where households suffer 
from a lack of both. Just as different illnesses often require 
different treatments, so too do different types of energy 
poverty. Therefore, we can consider there to be a total 1.35 
billion ‘incidences’ of energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa, 
with some incidences occurring in the same households. 
Most of these – 730 million – relate to individual people 
who lack access to clean and safe methods of cooking. 
They will be best serviced, primarily, through modern 
cooking technologies, such as LPG, biogas digesters and 
improved cookstoves. Of the remaining 620 million 
incidences (those people who lack access to electricity), 
between 52 per cent and 61 per cent would best be serviced 
through off-grid and mini-grid connections (IEA, 2014). 
As seen in Figure 11, only approximately 20 per 
cent of incidences of energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa 
could be addressed by expansions in utility-scale power 
generation and extension of the grid. Even within this 20 
per cent, initial consumption levels are likely to be low 
because of the inability of consumers to afford tariffs and 
electric appliances. To supply each of these households 
with 500 kWh per household would require an increase 
in on-grid generating capacity of only 6.8 per cent.21 The 
challenge is not generating this electricity; it is getting it to 
households living on very low incomes.  
Tackling energy poverty, therefore, has little to do with 
expanding generation capacity. Instead, it requires an 
entirely different set of targeted policy interventions to 
(1) improve the availability, cost and adoption of cleaner 
stoves and cooking fuels and (2) provide incremental 
electricity services to people without them. 
The barriers preventing low-income households from 
accessing modern cooking technologies include their 
relative cost compared to fuelwood and charcoal, as 
well as cultural preferences for food cooked over open 
flames. Time spent collecting fuelwood and the health 
consequences of household air pollution (once households 
are aware of them) are often motivating factors for 
switching fuels. 
Policies to promote modern cooking technologies 
could target these issues directly, while social marketing 
campaigns could increase awareness of the health and 
time impacts of traditional cooking methods. Where the 
charcoal trade is leading to deforestation, the regulation of 
fuelwood harvesting could ensure that the price of biomass 
reflects these negative impacts. In turn, the increased cost 
would incentivise fuel switching or investment in more 
efficient biomass stoves and charcoal kilns, although 
the ‘subsidy’ provided to poor households through free 
fuelwood collection would need to be replaced with 
incentives for cleaner cooking options. 
21 At 500 kWh per year, these households would consume less than 30 TWh as a whole.
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As shown, low-income households already spend a 
relatively large proportion of their income on kerosene for 
lighting and on fees for charging their mobile phones. In 
comparison to these expenditures, some renewable energy 
technologies, such as solar PV and solar lanterns, are 
actually cheaper options. The primary barrier to electricity 
access is often the limited purchasing power of low-income 
households, rather than the cost of the technologies. 
Policies could aim to improve access to consumer finance 
to enable these upfront costs to be smoothed out over 
time, although a number of renewable energy suppliers are 
already developing innovative payment methods without 
policy guidance (Hogarth, 2012). There is also a dearth of 
market infrastructure and technical capacity for off-grid 
and mini-grid technologies in rural Africa. To overcome 
these barriers, policies could aim to increase the workforce 
of renewable energy engineers and incubate enterprises 
that sell off-grid electricity technologies (Miller, 2009).
Finally, where grid connection is the most cost-effective 
option, the high cost of household grid connection fees 
and electricity tariffs still inhibit the access of the poorest 
households. Policies must prioritize these barriers. For 
example, Ethiopia’s Accelerated Access Expansion 
programme provided loans to rural consumers to cover the 
$98 connection fee. In Tunisia, consumers using less than 
50 kWh per month are charged a low-cost ‘lifeline tariff’ 
(World Bank, 2008b).
Acknowledging that the ‘industrial energy gap’ is largely 
separate from the ‘energy access gap’ this paper argues 
that a focus on poverty reduction requires prioritising 
energy access. Policies, finance and technical support 
should target off-grid renewable sources of electricity, LPG, 
biogas, and clean cookstoves to achieve the energy access 
aims they set out to deliver. Even beyond “direct” access 
of households, many of the electricity services that benefit 
poor people most directly—services consumed by health 
clinics, schools, and micro and small enterprises— are 
Figure 11. The total incidences of energy poverty in sub-Saharan Africa and the technologies and investment needed to secure 
universal access
Spending (US$):
   Projected investment per year  
(2014-2030)
   Amount needed per year for  
universal energy access (2010-2030)
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This figure breaks down incidences of energy poverty and the technologies and investment needed to treat each incidence. Many households will 
suffer from both forms of energy poverty, but households with clean cooking will still need electricity (and vice versa).
Source: based on data from IEA, 2011 and IEA 2014
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served by ambitiously scaling up the distribution even of 
relatively small amounts of electricity, rather than ambition 
on generation capacity. Importantly, distributed renewable 
energy technologies can help solve this distribution 
question, and require financing at scale. In a significant 
portion of cases, renewable energy is the most economically 
efficient option for the reduction of energy poverty.  
3.2 Expansion in centralised power generation serves 
industry, the services sector and already-connected 
households,  
The expansion of centralised power capacity will, in the 
absence of fairly radical political and institutional shifts, 
be geared towards supplying three growing areas of 
demand: (1) growing demand from households already 
connected to the electricity grid, (2) industry, and (3) 
urban-based enterprises in the services sector – primarily 
telecommunications, but also other types of micro-, small- 
and medium-scale enterprises. 
The debate on how best to close the large gap between 
present and forecasted demand is not simply one of energy 
‘access’. Indeed, improving electricity access would narrow 
only a small portion of this gap. 
This does not diminish the importance of supplying 
electricity to these three areas. Growth in the electricity 
consumption of economic groups that already have access 
to electricity is, of course, a worthwhile policy goal. And 
growth in the services sector is likely to contribute to 
poverty reduction through job creation and, possibly, 
through greater tax revenues for public services. 
It is important to recognise that industrialisation may 
be crucial to sustain poverty reductions over the long-term. 
One can understand the intuitive appeal of building on 
historic models that have defined the economic transition 
of other regions. Some industries are better than others at 
creating jobs, and industrialisation could, in theory, sustain 
a base for economic growth that funds public revenue and 
equalises policies over the long term. 
As in the rest of the world, sub-Saharan Africa faces 
hard choices on how to fulfil the energy demands of 
its industry and its growing middle-class in a carbon-
constrained world. For this reason, it is important to 
focus on the development of Africa’s substantial on-grid 
renewable electricity potential. As argued by a recent 
African Development Bank (AfDB) report, ‘Africa’s reserves 
of renewable energy resources are the highest in the world, 
and the continent has enough renewable energy potential 
to meet its future energy needs’ (Mukasa, Mutambatsere, 
Arvanitis, & Triki, 2013, p. 1).
That being said, just as poverty reduction is not the 
purpose of constructing a thermal coal power plant, it 
is not the purpose of policies that promote on-grid wind 
and solar. Grid connections will play an important role in 
supplying energy services that help to combat poverty, but 
the vast majority of on-grid electricity cannot be ‘assumed’ 
to achieve poverty reduction. 
Meanwhile, many of the energy services that are 
most important for poverty reduction – consumed at the 
household level, and even at the community and small 
enterprise level – require incremental, but widespread, 
energy access. If the aim is universal and sustainable 
poverty reduction, these opportunities should be given 
greater priority.
3.3 Distributed, clean energy interventions are best 
suited to tackling energy poverty – and poverty more 
generally
A co-benefit to closing most of the ‘energy access gap’ 
through distributed, clean energy technologies lies in 
avoided greenhouse gas emissions. In fact, addressing the 
largest component of energy poverty – inadequate access 
to modern cooking services – will have climate benefits. 
Bailis et al. (2005) estimated that annual net emissions from 
residential energy use in sub-Saharan Africa amounted 
to 79 million tonnes of carbon in 2000 (61 per cent 
from wood, 35 per cent from charcoal, 3 per cent from 
kerosene and 1 per cent from LPG). Furthermore, the paper 
projected that in the absence of systematic shifts in fuel use, 
cumulative emissions between 2000 and 2050 will be an 
estimated 6.7 gigatonnes of carbon – 5.6 per cent of Africa’s 
total emissions. For this reason, even though cooking with 
fossil fuels produces greenhouse gas emissions, a shift to 
kerosene or LPG or wherever the harvesting of biomass 
is unsustainable tends to represent a reduction in net 
emissions relative to traditional biomass cookstoves.22 
The climate implications of achieving universal access to 
electricity depend on how that electricity is generated, with 
different effects for on and off-grid generation. However, 
in both cases, very few emissions would be produced. 
This holds true even if we look beyond basic access to 
households, and include the pro-poor delivery of energy 
services via schools, clinics, and micro and small enterprises. 
Most households, schools, clinics, and micro and small 
enterprises in rural areas that would be supplied most 
economically through off-grid and mini-grids systems will 
gain access through renewable energy technologies. As for 
the 50 to 60 million electricity-poor households that would 
be served most cost-effectively through grid connections: 
their initial consumption will produce very few greenhouse 
gas emissions. Much could easily be fulfilled through the 
scale up of on-grid renewable energy technologies, such as 
small-scale hydro, geothermal, and wind. 
To be clear, not all energy services that are important 
for rapid poverty reduction would best be fulfilled with 
zero-carbon energy sources. In areas where wind and 
hydropower are not available, diesel generators and solar/
22 Kerosene is a more carbon-intensive fuel than LPG. Its net impact on emissions depends on the severity of deforestation and forest degradation in the 
area. The impact of a shift to electricity for cooking depends on how that electricity is generated (Jeuland & Pattanayak, 2012).
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diesel hybrid systems may provide the most cost-effective 
options for firms that need significant motive power. 
Urban-based micro and small enterprises, particularly 
in the services sector, will consume a notable quantity of 
electricity through grid connections, which may result 
in greater greenhouse gas emissions depending on how 
that electricity is generated. Even if the electricity were 
provided to these users through polluting technologies, 
the quantity of electricity demanded is relatively low. 
The same can be said for the 300 thousand unelectrified 
schools and 39 thousand unelectrified clinics. Providing 
access to these users is not where the climate challenge 
lies. These emissions will be minimal compared to those 
produced in fulfilling the energy services associated with 
industrialisation, which dominate the emissions associated 
with modern forms of energy consumption.
3.4 What does this mean for energy and poverty?
While an ambitious scale-up of clean centralised power 
supply is laudable, reducing poverty requires advancing 
energy services for households, schools, primary health 
facilities, and micro and small enterprises. 
When poverty reduction is a primary aim of 
development spending, then energy access should 
make up a greater share of energy portfolios. Figure 11 
showed that cooking technologies, while not expensive, 
face a significant shortfall in the investment needed to 
achieve universal access. However, the largest shortfall 
in investment to achieve universal energy access relates 
to distributed electricity systems. Over 2.5 times more 
additional investment is required to secure energy access 
through distributed systems than energy access through 
grid connections (IEA, 2011). 
These needs stand in stark contrast to current trends 
in development spending. A recent Sierra Club and Oil 
Change International report (2014, p. 3) found that, ‘With 
the exception of the African Development Bank at 38 per 
cent of its energy portfolio (by dollar amount), the MDBs’ 
overall energy portfolios largely did not target energy 
access for the poor. None of the banks’ current approaches 
to energy access were aligned with the IEA scenario in 
which 64 per cent of additional energy access funding 
flows to distributed energy solutions.’ The World Bank’s 
spending on energy access was as low as 8 per cent of its 
energy portfolio in 2013 (Sierra Club and Oil Change 
International, 2014).
If there is anywhere where “energy apartheid” can be 
said to exist, it is the absence of energy services for very 
poor people. In addressing the industrial energy gap, the 
formidable task of achieving energy access to all could 
be lost.  Ambition is not merely about the number of 
megawatts installed, but the number of people reached.
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